国企锦标赛激励效应与制约因素研究

本文尝试从锦标赛的角度为国企竞争理论提供信息经济学模型解释和实证支持。为了达到这一目的,本文从政府干预和共同代理的角度对经典的锦标赛模型进行细化和拓展,以揭示出国企锦标赛激励效应与制约因素,并收集2451家地方国有上市公司披露的薪酬差距数据对理论模型进行实证检验。理论模型表明,薪酬差距的扩大和国企经营者赢得经济锦标赛激励的强化会增加国企经营者的努力水平,因而有利于公司绩效的提升。不过,国企经营者赢得经济锦标赛的激励却受到政府行政干预和共同代理问题的制约。实证结果表明,我国地方国有上市公司薪酬差距与公司绩效显著正相关,而与地方政府行政干预和共同代理问题的严重程度显著负相关,从而支持了理论模型。     

THE STOCK MARKET, HOUSING AND CONSUMER SPENDING: A SURVEY OF THE EVIDENCE ON WEALTH EFFECTS

Abstract.  This paper examines the time-series and micro-econometric evidence on the relationship between stock and house prices and consumer spending. The time-series studies distinguish between short-run and long-run links between consumption, income and wealth. They allow us to identify which variables adjust to restore the long-run equilibrium in the case of a shock, and to determine the time taken by the adjustment process. The micro-econometric literature improves our understanding of the link between wealth and expenditure and distinguishes among the alternative hypotheses – of direct wealth effect, common causality and collateral channel – that have been proposed to explain this relationship. The relationship between wealth and consumer spending appears to be strong, but there is some disagreement as to its size and nature. Furthermore, there appear to be some important differences across countries, which should be allowed for by policy makers when appraising the policy implications of a change in asset prices.     

A panel data approach to economic forecasting: The bias-corrected average forecast

In this paper, we propose a novel approach to econometric forecasting of stationary and ergodic time series within a panel-data framework. Our key element is to employ the (feasible) bias-corrected average forecast. Using panel-data sequential asymptotics we show that it is potentially superior to other techniques in several contexts. In particular, it is asymptotically equivalent to the conditional expectation, i.e., has an optimal limiting mean-squared error. We also develop a zero-mean test for the average bias and discuss the forecast-combination puzzle in small and large samples. Monte-Carlo simulations are conducted to evaluate the performance of the feasible bias-corrected average forecast in finite samples. An empirical exercise, based upon data from a well known survey is also presented. Overall, these results show promise for the feasible bias-corrected average forecast.     

Environmental versus Human-Induced Scarcity in the Commons: Do They Trigger the Same Response?

We study appropriation strategies in common pool resources where extinction is a credible threat. Here we present an experimental study of the appropriation of common pool resources in a dynamic setting where resource availability depends on the initial environmental characteristics of the common resource and on human-induced resource depletion due to users’ appropriation patterns. Our results show that initial resource scarcity limits appropriation by inducing an initial caution among users that persists throughout of the game. Additionally, we find that subjects restrain their appropriation strategies when scarcity increases. However, this concern for resource scarcity is not enough to prevent resource depletion. Agents do not counteract the previous rounds’ appropriation strategies but follow the appropriation trend. High appropriation levels are followed by higher appropriation strategies, thus promoting the well known tragedy of the commons. Often concern for resource preservation is not great enough to limit appropriation.      

出口退税是一项稳健的贸易政策吗?

出口退税作为一项被WTO允许的政策工具,为许多国家的政府所使用。本文在一个国际多市场寡头模型之中,研究出口退税的稳健性。主要结论如下:(1)如果本国政府的目标是最大化国家福利,那么,出口退税不是一项稳健的贸易政策;(2)如果本国政府关心收入分配,对于国家福利的不同组成部分赋予不同的权重,那么,如果政府过于关注本国企业利润,而不是本国消费者剩余和出口退税成本,出口退税就会成为一项稳健的贸易政策;(3)本国政府过于关注本国企业利润的一个可能原因是,本国企业可以通过政治捐献去游说政府,制定对于自己有利的政策。那么,如果相对于国家福利而言,政府过于关注政治捐献,出口退税就会成为一项稳健的贸易政策。     

On the (in)effectiveness of rewards in sustaining cooperation

We study the effectiveness of costly rewards in mitigating excess extraction in a standard Common Pool Resource (CPR) game experiment. We implement two treatments. In the first, rewards are a pure transfer from one player to the other. In the second, the benefits of receiving a reward are higher than the cost of providing it. Referring to the latter as “net positive” rewards, we observe that these are used more frequently than transfer rewards, and that, unlike transfer rewards, they are effective in sustaining cooperation in the CPR game. JEL Classification C72, C92, D74     

经济环境、调控政策与区域房价——基于面板数据同期强相关视角

本文关注经济环境与调控政策等共同冲击对区域房价的影响,强调重大事件与我国房地产市场变动的内在关系;试图从同期相关视角出发,构建区域房价的共同因子模型,并利用2002第一季度至2012第四季度省际面板数据进行实证分析。结果表明：（1）区域房价受经济环境与调控政策两个因子影响;（2）相对于其它经济事件,次贷危机对我国各地区房价的影响最大,相对于其它时期的房价调控政策,2003年-2008年的调控政策更为有效;（3）各地区对共同冲击的反映是异质的。从而,政府在制订房价调控政策时应充分考虑市场反应,以促进房地产市场的协调平稳发展。     

Weakly rational expectations

Aumann and Drèze (2008) characterised the set of interim expected payoffs that players may have in rational belief systems, in which there is common knowledge of rationality and a common prior. We show here that common knowledge of rationality is not needed: when rationality is satisfied in the support of an action-consistent distribution (a concept introduced by Barelli (2009)), one obtains exactly the same set of rational expectations, despite the fact that in such ‘weakly rational belief systems’ there may not be mutual knowledge of rationality, let alone common knowledge of rationality. In the special case of two-player zero-sum games, the only expected payoff is the minmax value, even under these weak assumptions.     

基于共同冲击和异质风险叠加传导的风险传染研究——来自中国上市银行网络的传染模拟

本文将银行系统遭遇外部共同冲击作为研究起点,建立了一个共同冲击和异质风险交互传导与放大的简化模型,冲击的传导包括“原始冲击”、“增量冲击”和“违约冲击”三个风险传染阶段。基于2018年我国15家上市银行的股票收益率和年报数据、2006年至2018年的银行评级数据,本文构建了贝叶斯分层图模型和银行间拆借矩阵,并利用蒙特卡洛模拟测度不同触发银行所引发的系统性风险损失、单个银行的系统性风险杠杆能力(文中定义为“传染乘数”指标)以及政府监管介入的效果。模拟结果显示:共同冲击损失远大于异质风险损失;规模和网络关联性是决定传染乘数的重要因素,且当规模因素不突出时,网络关联性对传染乘数的决定作用相对更强,极容易出现小规模、高关联性银行具有较高的传染乘数;当银行风险资产损失率在10%至25%之间时,造成系统性风险损失的杠杆能力普遍增强;政府监管介入能较好地降低系统性风险。本研究的相关结论为系统性风险的监管设计提供经验证据和参考。     

Revenues in discrete multi-unit, common value auctions: a study of three sealed-bid mechanisms

This paper proposes a discrete bidding model for both quantities and pricing. It has a two-unit demand environment where subjects bid for contracts with an unknown redemption value, common to all bidders. Prior to bidding, the bidders receive private signals of information on the (common) value. The relevant task is to compare the equilibrium strategies and the seller’s revenue of the three most common auction formats with two players. The result is that the Vickrey auction always gives the most revenue to the seller, the discriminatory auction follows closely and the uniform auction clearly is the worst due to demand reduction.